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Abstract 
The Jesuit (and Catholic) educational tradition is characterized by a number of identity-conferring basic 
positions that are incompatible with correlative positions on offer in the popular culture. Some of these 
fundamental differences between the tradition and the culture are philosophical in nature in that they bear on 
questions of moral truth and philosophical anthropology. Institutions of higher education committed to 
forming their students in light of these basic and counter-cultural beliefs must ensure that the incompatible 
cultural alternatives are carefully examined and the reasonableness of the Ignatian (Catholic) alternatives 
carefully explored. The discipline Philosophy plays an irreplaceable role in this sort of tradition-culture 
engagement. With this in mind, institutions of higher education that claim the Jesuit and Catholic tradition as 
their own must ensure that Philosophy remains (or is restored to) a significant part of their core curricula. 
Not too long ago I had the opportunity to work 
with a cohort of twelve first-year medical students 
at a local medical school. My task was to deliver to 
these future doctors the ethics component of a 
year-long course in the profession of medicine; we 
would meet three or four times that year and 
discuss the field of medical ethics. Although our 
time together would be short, I was keen on 
getting to know these students on a somewhat 
personal basis. At our initial meeting I asked each 
of them where they grew up, where they went to 
college, why they wanted to be a physician, etc. In 
the course of that first meeting, in order to gauge 
their formal preparation for thinking about 
medical ethics, I also asked them whether they had 
any undergraduate coursework in philosophy. 
Only three raised a hand. Of these three, two had 
a semester-long self-standing course in ethics as 
part of their undergraduate degree requirements.1 
These two students, the two whose undergraduate 
education seemed to have left them better 
prepared than their peers to navigate the moral 
dimensions of their chosen field, were Jesuit 
educated; one was from the University of 
Scranton, the other from Xavier University. I 
offer this story both as a point of pride for those 
of us engaged in Jesuit higher education and as a 
way to emphasize the importance of preserving 
the study of Philosophy as a distinctive mark of 
this tradition. It is disturbing to see so many 
colleges and universities proudly turn out future 
physicians, nurses, teachers, attorneys, 
accountants, etc. who are technically proficient yet 
unprepared to work through the moral quandaries 
that await them in their chosen field, and to 
engage the great existential questions that life will 
sooner or later press upon them. A core 
requirement in this ancient discipline would no 
doubt be a step in the right direction for these 
institutions, and eliminating or reducing such a 
requirement would no doubt be a step in the 
wrong direction for Jesuit colleges and 
universities. 
While it may be the case that decision-makers at 
Jesuit colleges and universities will continue to 
ensure that exposure to philosophy remains a 
distinctive mark of the education these institutions 
offer, a “some Philosophy, any Philosophy” 
minimalist approach to executing this 
commitment would surely leave many students 
underserved. Questions about what our students’ 
exposure to this discipline should look like must 
be answered thoughtfully. The breadth of 
Philosophy and the rather common need to fit a 
requirement in this discipline into just one or two 
courses require difficult decisions to be made. 
Logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and 
social and political philosophy are just a few of the 
areas one might like to cover, and each of these 
branches has subdivisions of its own. To sort 
through the multitude of options and make 
appropriate decisions about what all of their 
graduates ought to know, a Jesuit institution 
would do well to ask itself what it seeks to 
accomplish by means of this element of its core 
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curriculum. Wrestling with that question should 
raise two other questions: “What do the Jesuit and 
Catholic traditions—traditions that these 
institutions publicly claim as their own—have to 
say about the matter?” and “What feature(s) 
should a Philosophy requirement at Jesuit and 
Catholic schools operating in the early 21st-
century first-world share?” Such questions draw 
the focus of decision-makers away from their own 
philosophical preferences and specialties and place 
it on two often-clashing outlooks on the human 
being and the world: that offered by the Jesuit and 
Catholic tradition, and that offered by the 
dominant culture from which our students come 
and to which they will return.  
If Jesuit institutions of higher education carefully 
assess and refine the Philosophy component of 
their respective curricula in the manner described 
above, it may very well turn out that their alumni, 
including the aforementioned medical students 
from Xavier and Scranton, will enjoy a common 
philosophical foundation, one that will give them 
a shared outlook, idiom, and way of proceeding as 
they—separately and together—respond to the 
Ignatian challenge to be salt and light in the world. 
What, though, should that shared foundation look 
like? 
Cura personalis, magis, finding God in all things, and 
metanoia are Ignatian terms that are employed in 
much of the serious talk regarding the institutional 
identity and educational aspirations of Jesuit 
colleges and universities. These words express 
ideas that shape our institutions and are frequently 
offered as ultimate justifications for policies and 
practices in all areas of institutional life. These 
ideas shape how we seek to shape our students. 
Yet what sometimes goes unnoticed in this 
Ignatian educational discourse is that these words 
and phrases are philosophically heavy; heavy in 
what they presuppose and heavy in what they call 
those committed to this tradition to do (and not 
to do). Were they to be evacuated of this deeper 
philosophical meaning, these terms might be 
reduced to vague, cost-free clichés that give an 
Ignatian luster to all sorts of policies and 
proposals that are appealing for any number of 
other reasons, while demanding little of those who 
invoke them and offering no guidance to students 
exposed to them. Here is where Philosophy has an 
important role to play. 
There are certain cultural tendencies, perhaps pre-
critical habits of thought, that bump up against the 
foundational, philosophically substantive 
commitments of the Ignatian worldview. A 
student who has been well grounded in 
Philosophy and who appreciates the philosophical 
dimensions of these Ignatian commitments will be 
prepared to go into the world, challenge these 
“errors of the age,” and offer a better alternative. 
In doing so these men and women can change the 
world in ways that others cannot, taking what has 
been passed on to them by the Jesuit tradition and 
offering it to their coworkers, their family, their 
friends, their neighbors. Indeed, the right kind of 
philosophical background can empower these 
graduates to become links in a chain that stretches 
back for centuries and which, through them, will 
reach into the future.  
 But what are these “errors of the age” and how 
do they philosophically bump up against the 
aforementioned ideas at the heart of Jesuit 
education? In what follows, I offer three. There 
are no doubt more, and maybe even some that are 
more profound than the three I examine, but the 
three I identify are at work in our students’ basic 
outlook and, at the same time, are deeply at odds 
with the basic commitments of the Ignatian 
tradition that we call our own and promise to pass 
on to our students. The three ideas that I speak of 
are materialism, individualism, and relativism.  
* 
The “materialism” in play here is metaphysical 
materialism. Let this phrase stand for what Thomas 
Nagel describes as 
a comprehensive, speculative world 
picture that is reached by extrapolation 
from some of the discoveries of biology, 
chemistry, and physics—a particular 
naturalistic Weltanschauung that postulates 
a hierarchical relation among the subjects 
of those sciences, and the completeness 
in principle of an explanation of 
everything in the universe through their 
unification.2 
Nagel’s words lay out well the grand idea behind 
what so many students accept as the starting point 
and reasonable parameters for all serious inquiry 
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regarding the human person, namely, that 
everything “really real” about us is fully 
explainable by reference to our material 
constituents. The belief is that human beings are 
merely biological creatures, and that the whole of 
one’s interior life—deliberating, willing, hoping, 
loving, wondering, worshipping, etc.—is in reality 
only a complex nexus of biological phenomena. 
For so many students this is the presumptively-
true background account of the human being; the 
solid ground upon which serious-minded people 
stride.3 While our culture, including our students, 
may not have this background anthropology laid 
out in their minds as elaborately as Nagel’s 
formulation, it is nevertheless the case that so 
many believe it to be true. Why is this so? 
The materialism uncritically adopted by so many 
of our students appears to be allied with the 
epistemological principle, also uncritically 
adopted, that only “scientific” knowledge is 
authentic knowledge. These metaphysical and 
epistemological commitments underwrite the 
principle that all and only the deliverances of 
“science” are to be accepted as features of 
objective reality.4 A worldview hangs on this 
principle; the difference between the propositions 
Science gives us knowledge of part of reality and Science 
alone determines what is real is profound. The latter 
leaves no room for any matter-independent 
dimension to reality, and so belief in a soul, God, 
and free will, that is, belief that these are really real 
despite being empirically undetectable, becomes 
intellectually disreputable and thus somewhat 
embarrassing in serious public conversation. While 
many do believe in such things, these beliefs bear 
the taint of a dubious provenance given that they 
are based not upon science but upon the softer 
ground composed of some mixture of blind faith, 
upbringing (which means, to some critics, 
indoctrination), and/or a personal (read purely 
subjective) experience. While students may support 
a certain amount of public space for one “to 
personally believe” in such things, the consensus 
view seems to be that these beliefs cannot rise to 
the status of knowledge because the requisite 
empirical justification is, by the very nature of the 
objects in question, unavailable.5 
It is not difficult to see how this account of what 
is real conflicts with the Ignatian ideas of cura 
personalis, magis, finding God in all things, and metanoia. 
It makes them all to be, at best, ennobling cultural 
myth and, at worst, naive nonsense. What exactly 
is an attitude of “care” in this worldview? What 
are aspirations for “the greater” on this account of 
the human being? For that matter, what is the 
measure of the good, the greater, the lesser? What 
is a “mind” here, and what does it mean to seek a 
transformation of self? And what a fool’s errand it 
is to try to find God in anything, let alone in all 
things. If metaphysical materialism is true, then 
the foundational commitments and animating 
aspirations of the entire Ignatian educational 
tradition are—to put it in the most philosophically 
charitable words—held without warrant.  
Philosophy, however, has something to say on 
behalf of the philosophical anthropology that the 
Jesuit and Catholic tradition offers. Consider Pope 
Emeritus Benedict XVI’s observation that freedom, 
love, and evil are “three themes fundamental to 
human existence.”6 Consider, too, the late 20th 
century Catholic writer Walker Percy’s 
observation that  
[t]his life is much too much trouble, far 
too strange, to arrive at the end of it and 
then be asked what you make of it and 
have to answer, ‘Scientific humanism.’ 
That won’t do. A poor show.7 
Finally, consider Walt Whitman’s experience that 
“a morning-glory at my window satisfies me more 
than the metaphysics of books.”8 Taken together, 
these three (of countless) examples manifest the 
remarkable human capacity to engage in serious 
philosophical reflection about a wide range of 
experiences, and to be conscious of oneself 
engaging in such reflections. Yet all of these 
activities and experiences are among the data that 
must be explained, and explained well, by any 
account of the human being that claims to be 
complete and credible. Graduates of institutions 
that place themselves within the Jesuit and 
Catholic tradition ought to have considered 
carefully a slew of interrelated philosophical 
questions provoked by these authors’ words. This 
tradition is rich with thinkers and texts that model 
such careful introspection, like St. Augustine’s 5th 
century Confessions and St. John Paul II’s 20th 
century personalism.9 One recurring philosophical 
question of particular importance here is whether 
materialism offers a sufficient explanation—that 
Tully: Philosophy in Our Core 
 Jesuit Higher Education 6(2): 155-165 (2017) 158 
is, a complete and credible account—for the wide 
variety of activities and experiences that fill the 
student’s daily life. The problematic explanatory 
gap between a third-person objective account of 
their life as an organism and their inescapably 
first-person experiences as a self in the world 
should be familiar territory to them. 
Furthermore, while considering accounts that 
purport to fill this explanatory gap, students 
should also understand well the inherent weakness 
of the often-assumed but less-often examined 
principle that only empirical explanations are 
acceptable. As contemporary philosopher Edward 
Feser points out, that kind of popular, pre-critical 
scientism is either self-defeating or trivially true. 
The proposition Only scientific knowledge is authentic 
knowledge is not itself scientifically (“scientifically” 
understood here in a narrow sense of 
“empirically”) verifiable, and thus the principle 
eliminates itself. If one were to avoid this 
difficulty by expanding the meaning of “scientific 
knowledge” to include any conclusion drawn by 
means of reasoning from observed data (including 
first-person data introspectively observed) to 
unobserved proportionate causes, then the 
improved statement would become rather less 
controversial and, more to the point, unable to 
ground a peremptory dismissal of the 
metaphysical presuppositions behind the Ignatian 
ideals we have been considering.10  
* 
Individualism is another cultural error that bumps 
up against the accounts of the person, the world, 
and God that underlie well-known Ignatian 
commitments. As with materialism, it is likely the 
case that many students at Jesuit institutions have 
uncritically adopted this basic stance from the 
culture rather than appropriated it as their own 
after a careful philosophical examination of its 
foundations and implications. The individualism 
in question here identifies the subject as the 
uncontested criterion of just about everything that 
has anything to do with the good for oneself and 
the kind of life one chooses to lead. This cultural 
norm leaves little room for anything other than 
oneself to question the truth of one’s judgments 
bearing upon such matters. Almost thirty years 
ago philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre described this 
cultural shift as heading in the direction of “the 
privatization of the good.”11 Two years later the 
Supreme Court of the United States gave voice 
and heft to this outlook by proclaiming that “at 
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life.”12 
The more recent phenomenon of publicly 
identifying as something other than what one 
manifestly is, and the mutually-affirming 
narcissism that characterizes much of social 
media, are perhaps symptoms of this elevation and 
acceptance of the self as the unquestioned final 
criterion for answers to an ever-widening set of 
questions. The commonplace invocation of the 
principle of autonomy as the (putatively) supreme 
principle that ought to settle so many morally 
significant public policy questions (e.g., those 
regarding access to abortion, physician-assisted 
suicide, and pornography) both reflects and 
reinforces this tendency. One notable 
manifestation of the sort of individualism in 
question here can be found in the area of 
reproductive technology. The laboratory 
production of a child according to the preferences 
of the parent(s) is a widely accepted project which 
regularly includes the discarding of other 
laboratory-generated embryos who do not fit the 
desired profile. Furthermore, this desired profile 
may be one that includes a disability. In some 
cases the production of the preferred kind of child 
may involve not only the selection of an embryo 
with a certain disability, but also the subsequent 
choice by the parent(s) not to mitigate the 
disability by means of available and effective 
therapies.13 What morally underwrites this practice 
(insofar as it is ever seriously challenged) are 
individualized, subjective accounts of health and 
disability that are grounded not in the nature of the 
thing (that is, in the proper functioning of the 
organs and systems of the human being) but in the 
preferences of the parent(s).14 As suggested earlier, 
a similar autonomy-heavy, individualistic approach 
to the value of life is found in the standard cases 
in favor of rights to abortion and physician-
assisted suicide.15  
Students emerging from institutions of higher 
education that claim the Jesuit and Catholic 
traditions as their own ought to be prepared to 
challenge philosophically our culture’s habitual 
and seemingly rarely examined elevation of the 
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individual. Philosophy does have the resources to 
lay bare and push back against what so many 
students seem to take for granted, namely, that 
each person is alone competent to craft his or her 
own answers to the basic questions, “What am 
I?”, “What is the value of my life?”, and “How 
ought I live?”, and that such self-constitution is 
best done free of any unwanted baggage that 
family, community, and tradition would offer as 
guidance. Contemporary philosophers Peter 
Singer and Alasdair MacIntyre, despite widely 
divergent views on many important issues, each 
call attention to the eminently contestable 
philosophical anthropology that is suggested by 
this cultural orthodoxy. Singer finds the idea of 
the “independent individual” to be “unhistorical, 
abstract and ultimately inexplicable.”16 MacIntyre 
elaborates, pointing to some indisputable facts 
about each of us:  
We find ourselves placed at some 
particular point within a network of 
relationships of giving and receiving in 
which, generally and characteristically, 
what and how far we are able to give 
depends in part on what and how far we 
received…. So understood, the 
relationships from which the independent 
practical reasoner emerges and through 
which she or he continues to be sustained 
are such that from the outset she or he is 
in debt.17 
With each human being having been utterly at the 
mercy of, and shaped by, particular families, 
communities, and traditions, the idea of the 
independent individual on offer in our culture is a 
fiction, an impoverished account of the concrete 
person. MacIntyre also points to certain recurring 
patterns that are no doubt to be found in each 
student’s life and that generate certain basic 
commitments that are neither revocable nor 
conditioned upon one’s changeable preferences:  
And the kind of care that was needed to 
make us what we have in fact 
become…had to be, if it was to be 
effective, unconditional care for the 
human being as such, whatever the 
outcome. And this is the kind of care that 
we in turn now owe or will owe.18 
The challenge to the individualism of the day 
offered by just these two philosophers is 
substantial and sophisticated, and there is more 
where it came from. Our graduates should know 
these challenges well. 
Perhaps some students have moved past the sort 
of inchoate individualism in question here and 
endorse some form of libertarianism. Their strand 
of individualism may be one that follows the spirit 
of Ayn Rand, whose character John Galt declares 
“I swear, by my life and my love of it, that I will 
never live for the sake of another man, nor ask 
another man to live for mine.”19 Rand believed 
that “[i]f any civilization is to survive, it is the 
morality of altruism that men have to reject.”20 At 
the heart of this posture towards the world stands 
the atomic individual, and the development of 
civilization is to be measured in terms of its 
“progress toward a society of privacy.”21 Yet, as 
with the aforementioned brand of individualism, 
this notion of the human being and this account 
of progress seems conceptually incompatible with 
the Ignatian ideal of cura personalis as a legitimate 
and authoritative call to serve the authentic well-
being of others. The great distance between the 
ideals of Rand and those of Ignatius is made 
manifest simply by attending to the sort of 
metanoia that each calls for. Here again, Philosophy 
has something important to say. For example, 
Robert George, a contemporary public intellectual 
who has spent a career philosophically articulating 
and defending elements of the moral worldview 
which Jesuit colleges and universities claim as their 
own, explains that libertarianism 
affirms a genuine truth—in this case, the 
value and importance of liberty or 
personal autonomy—but affirms it so 
emphatically and indeed single-mindedly 
that it winds up denying other equally 
important truths and values. 
Libertarianism of the Ayn Randian sort 
emphasizes individualism so strongly that 
it ends up treating human sociability and 
the values connected to it (e.g., friendship, 
marriage, community, solidarity) as purely 
instrumental goods, rather than intrinsic 
and constitutive aspects of human well-
being and fulfillment. The value of human 
relationships and associations is reduced 
to their utility and efficiency in enabling 
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the partners or members to achieve their 
individual goals.22 
George, MacIntyre, and Singer are just a few 
notable philosophers who offer a reasoned 
critique of, and plausible alternative to, the 
individualism that characterizes so much of 
contemporary culture, the culture from which our 
students come and to which they shall return. The 
insights that these and other philosophers offer 
are grounded in reason and other common 
elements of the lived experience of these students. 
This lived experience, together with the kind of 
sustained critical reflection that characterizes 
Philosophy, can provide an oft-missing measure 
of rational depth and force to the Ignatian ideals 
that shape the identity and characteristic discourse 
of Jesuit colleges and universities. In this way, 
Philosophy offers an irreplaceable contribution to 
our tradition’s case that the individualism of the 
day does not withstand scrutiny, and that the 
obligations related to cura personalis and being men 
and women for others are more than mere 
sentiment. This case, grounded as it is in reason 
and common experience, may travel well as the 
students leave our institutions and re-enter the 
world. 
* 
In addition to materialism and individualism, 
moral relativism—the belief that there are no 
objective moral truths to be known—is a 
background belief that so many students bring 
with them into our classrooms. This belief is to be 
distinguished from the idea that moral truths are 
difficult to discern but are, at least in principle, 
knowable (like, for instance, the truths of particle 
physics). The underlying metaphysical position is 
simple: there is no moral dimension to reality that 
one can know in the robust sense of this term. As 
with the other two background beliefs already 
discussed, our students’ commitment to this kind 
of relativism seems not to have been borne of 
careful and sustained philosophical deliberation. 
Most students seem to take for granted that one 
can, with persistent and careful study, correctly 
grasp the nature of quarks and stars and viruses 
and gravity. These things are, in a loose sense, 
“out there” to be known; they are “really real” and 
one can get it right about them (and one can get it 
wrong, too, as history has shown). With morality, 
however, such is not the case. So many students 
take it for granted that even the most settled 
moral beliefs are not really true in any “hard” 
sense, that is, in any sense that would allow one to 
say that those who think otherwise are actually 
mistaken, that they are in error. Their relativism fits 
rather easily with the materialism and 
individualism that round out this suite of ideas 
that shape so much of their worldview. It also 
disposes them to accept some of the more 
philosophically elaborated defenses of this 
position, leaving them to wonder skeptically what 
sort of empirical confirmation can be found for 
the belief that something even as odious as slavery 
is, in fact, objectively morally wrong. “Where,” they 
might learn ask, “would one look, and what would 
one need to observe, to confirm (or falsify) this 
proposition?” Finally, if what is authentically good 
for an individual is simply whatever he or she 
asserts to be good based upon personal feelings 
and preferences (which surely have been partly 
shaped by cultural practices and preferences), on 
what grounds could one individual claim that 
another’s conception of the good is inadequate, or 
even mistaken? Can a preference be mistaken? 
What would such an assertion even mean? 
With the status of moral “facts” thus settled, 
moral beliefs lose objective measure and, with 
that, rational force. Contemporary philosopher 
and teacher James McBrayer finds this 
downgrading of moral beliefs to be rooted in a 
dangerous, unsustainable, and demonstrably false 
distinction between fact and opinion that has been 
woven into the curriculum and culture of so many 
elementary and secondary schools. According to 
McBrayer, many of our students come to our 
institutions believing that a fact is “something that 
is true about a subject and can be tested or 
proven” and a belief is merely “what someone 
thinks, feels, or believes.”23 Over the course of 
their primary and secondary education, it becomes 
axiomatic to these students that each of our claims 
belongs in one, and only one, of these two 
categories.24 As soon as the claims of morality are 
placed in their proper category, namely that of 
belief, the notion that some moral claims could be 
true and others false becomes intellectually 
unsustainable (and culturally inappropriate). The 
fruit of this categorizing and consequent deflating 
of moral claims is a moral relativism that 
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undermines any serious moral discourse about 
what is right and what is good.25 
Here is MacIntyre’s “privatization of the good” in 
full bloom. Individualism and moral relativism 
each contribute to the idea that what is 
authentically good for any individual is simply 
what that individual determines to be good for 
himself or herself, and this determination will be 
based upon personal feelings and preferences. 
This account of the human good, and its 
corollaries in the fields of applied ethics and 
public policy, seems to function as common 
ground in our students’ moral worldviews, 
however inchoate these worldviews may be. 
Because it is rarely, if ever, called into question 
these students fail to see that this common ground 
ultimately reduces to what McIntyre calls “private 
arbitrariness.”26 
One of the costs of this moral worldview is the 
rather stultified moral reasoning that its adherents 
often engage in. Many students earnestly endorse 
moral propositions regarding substantive human 
goods (e.g., Health care is good; we as a people should 
promote it.) that, when coupled with their 
characteristic default-to-relativism, makes them 
vulnerable to a certain kind of manipulation. For 
example, in the morally complex field of 
biomedical research, proponents of research 
projects often employ moral terms in their cases 
for public funding. They explain that the proposed 
research is aimed at developing cures and 
therapies for certain diseases and thus is good and 
ought to be supported legally and financially. 
Students are often persuaded by such cases and 
express support for public policies to protect, and 
public funding to facilitate, these endeavors. Yet 
when serious moral objections are raised about 
some element(s) of an otherwise appealing project 
(say, that it calls for creating and experimenting 
upon human embryos) many of these same 
students summarily dismiss such concerns 
because, they point out, moral objections are really 
just subjective preferences that must not be 
imposed upon others and must not be permitted 
to obstruct progress. In this way the culture has 
formed these students in such a way that they 
constitute easy and reliable support for such 
morally problematic research.27 
Philosophy, though, can help here. It is the 
discipline best equipped to challenge those for 
whom moral relativism is the presumptively right 
position. Instead of treating relativism as the 
enlightened third way above the fray of ongoing 
moral disagreement, Philosophy asks, persistently 
and in an intellectually demanding way, simple but 
profound questions such as “Is moral relativism 
true?” and “How does one know it to be true (or 
false)?” Furthermore, this discipline teaches us not 
to accept any answer simply because it is sincerely 
held. Instead, it demands that all answers be 
philosophically developed and subjected to 
sustained critical scrutiny; reasoning and evidence, 
not feeling and popularity, are the standards that 
must be met. 
James Rachels is one contemporary philosopher 
who challenges moral relativism by asking 
relativists why a reasonable person ought to 
believe their foundational claim that there are no 
objective moral truths. Rachels reports that the 
answer he would usually receive was something 
along the lines of, “Because people disagree on 
moral issues.”28 This answer is consistent with the 
answer that I have been offered by so many 
students throughout my teaching career. Yet, 
Rachels presses, how is it that disagreement over a 
particular issue is sufficient to show that there is 
no objective truth in that area? Perhaps, he offers, 
one reason there is disagreement in this area is 
that some people are right and others are 
mistaken. 29 Such is often the most reasonable 
explanation for disagreement in other areas of 
human inquiry. Consider history and the various 
sciences. The story of each of these disciplines is 
rife with disagreement, yet it is not considered a 
sign of great wisdom to conclude from this fact 
that there is no objective truth in these areas. Yet 
so many students find this to be the only 
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the fact 
of moral disagreement. The inconsistency here is 
rather noteworthy, but is a problem of which few 
students seem to take note.  
Furthermore, Rachels and many others suggest 
that the proponents of this standard case for 
relativism overstate the nature and depth of the 
moral disagreement one observes. Does a bit of 
careful study not reveal at least hints of a 
historically and culturally transcendent consensus 
on at least a few foundational principles (e.g., 
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Friendship is to be respected; Health should be promoted), 
a consensus that perhaps points away from 
relativism? Assuming that anything short of 
unanimity trumps any claim to truth in this area of 
inquiry, some thoughtful students might quickly 
point to individuals who claim to remain outside 
of this putative moral consensus (in my 
experience, these individuals are always 
hypothetical since the students know no real 
deniers of these propositions) as a defeating 
counter example. Yet to this granting of veto-
power to the (imagined?) gainsayer, 20th century 
philosopher Anthony Flew had this to say: 
The attempt to show that there is no 
philosophical knowledge by simply urging 
that there is always someone who can be 
relied on to remain unconvinced is a 
common fallacy...I called it the But-
There-Is-Always-Someone-Who-Will-
Never-Agree Diversion.30  
In this way philosophy can diagnose and offer 
reason-based pushback against the moral 
relativism that is orthodoxy among so many of 
our students. This particular error leaves no room 
for belief in the objectivity and truthfulness of the 
moral dimensions of Ignatian ideals like cura 
personalis, metanoia, and the Ignatian call to be men 
and women for others; it must be challenged if 
these elements of our tradition are to be found 
credible. 
* 
Philosophy is a discipline uniquely equipped to 
prepare our students to stand athwart the 
materialism, individualism, and moral relativism of 
our culture. It offers sustained, reason-based 
critiques of these cultural presumptions which are 
in irreconcilable conflict with some of the deepest 
commitments of the Jesuit and Catholic tradition. 
Other disciplines—Literature, History, Theology, 
etc.—each in their own way can challenge these 
errors, but none can do so in the manner of 
philosophy. As each of these three errors is, at 
bottom, a properly philosophical claim, each is in 
need of a properly philosophical challenge. 
Furthermore, the Jesuit and Catholic tradition’s 
respective alternatives to each of these claims are 
in need of robust and properly philosophical 
articulation and defense given that each is an 
identity-contributing element to this tradition. As 
educators in institutions committed to the 
Ignatian principles cura personalis, metanoia, the 
magis, and finding God in all things, is it not our 
obligation to prepare our students to push back 
against these harmful and mistaken cultural 
presumptions by offering them our tradition’s 
richer and more accurate accounts of the person, 
the community, and the world? 
Consider for a moment just a few of the properly 
philosophical questions generated by the familiar 
Ignatian ideal cura personalis: What does this phrase 
mean? Who counts as a person: the unborn, the 
permanently unconscious, the profoundly 
disabled? Why? Is cura personalis objectively 
obligatory, or merely a suggested way of 
proceeding? Is failure to care for the person a 
moral failure? What is a moral failure? What is 
authentic care? Is there such thing as inauthentic or 
false care? By what criteria does one make such a 
judgment? Are there authentic human goods? St. 
Ignatius believed the answer to this last question 
to be “yes.” Plato agreed. In Plato’s Gorgias one 
finds Socrates criticizing the orator Gorgias for 
pandering to his audience rather than teaching 
them about right and wrong. “The difference,” 
Socrates explains, “is that pandering pays no 
regard to the best interests of its object but 
catches fools with the bait of ephemeral pleasure 
and tricks them into holding it in the highest 
esteem.”31 Socrates goes on to declare this sort of 
approach “dishonorable” in that “it makes 
pleasure its aim instead of good” and “because it 
has no rational understanding of the nature of the 
various things it applies to or the person to whom 
it applies.”32 Here the great Socrates gestures 
toward a philosophical claim that forms part of 
the foundation of the Catholic intellectual 
tradition, namely, that there are authentic human 
goods that are the keys to human well-being, and 
that there are false, counterfeit “goods” that tempt 
one in the other direction. But is Socrates (and St. 
Ignatius) right here? Is this foundational claim, a 
claim which anchors the Ignatian notion cura 
personalis, true? If so, what are these authentic 
human goods that ought to be pursued? These are 
among the properly philosophical questions that 
must be addressed systematically if one committed 
to caring for persons is to be confident that their 
obligation is real and that the care they are 
providing is authentic. Given this requirement, an 
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institution committed to handing on to its 
students an understanding of, and developing in 
them a sustained commitment to, the Ignatian 
ideal cura personalis should see to it that these 
students appreciate the philosophical grounds of 
this ideal. In doing so, these institutions will be 
preparing their students to push back against the 
widespread tendency to level all accounts of what 
is good and what is right by reducing them all to 
mere cultural idiosyncrasy and/or personal 
preference.  
The foregoing does not come close to exhausting 
the ways in which one might trace out the 
philosophical dimensions of the notion cura 
personalis. Notice that if the good of a particular 
thing is determined by the nature of that thing, 
then an investigation into the good of the person 
will involve an investigation into the nature of the 
person. And here again one sees the Ignatian 
understanding of the human being to be 
conceptually incompatible with the materialism 
discussed above. According to the tradition that 
Jesuit colleges and universities claim as their own, 
the person is (in very broad terms) a body-mind 
combination, each part an essential aspect of the 
identity of the whole. Care for the person, 
therefore, is care for a being whose body is part of 
its identity, but which is, at the same time, not 
merely a body. The implications of this 
philosophical anthropology on what should count 
as authentic cura personalis are profound. Following 
the Ignatian account, to promote, protect, and 
respect the living human body, whether an 
embryo, a newborn, a profoundly disabled child, 
an aging adult suffering from dementia, etc., is to 
promote, protect, and respect the person. Our 
students should, at the very least, understand the 
nuanced philosophical arguments that underwrite 
this position. They should come to see just how 
the de-personalization and instrumentalization of 
the body on offer in our culture—the renting of 
surrogate mothers, the purchasing of organs from 
the poor, the banality of sex in a hook-up culture 
saturated with pornography, the sexualization of 
ever-younger girls, the putative “right” to 
physician-assisted suicide, the normalization of 
contraception, the laboratory production of 
embryonic human beings for experimentation, just 
to name a few—are incompatible with this 
understanding of the person as essentially, but not 
exclusively, a living body always at some particular 
stage along the continuum of growth and decline. 
The simple and profound philosophical questions 
generated by these conflicting anthropologies 
should be addressed head on: Which is the more 
adequate account?33 Are the practices identified 
above consistent with a correct understanding of 
the subject who is the object of cura personalis? Do 
such practices serve the authentic good of all 
those involved? Note, again, that these are 
properly philosophical questions, and they 
demand properly philosophical attention. If Jesuit 
institutions of higher education are going to 
recommend our vision of the human person over 
that offered by much of contemporary culture, 
then it is incumbent upon us to do so in a manner 
that is philosophically serious. Here, then, one 
finds a crucial and irreplaceable role for 
Philosophy in bringing our students to appropriate 
the truths of our tradition and take them out to 
the culture. 
* 
The challenge briefly laid out here is nothing new. 
It is just the Socratic (and Ignatian) call to the 
examined life. As mentioned earlier, there are 
many disciplines, each in its distinctive way, which 
can challenge our students to examine not only 
their own lives but also the life of their 
communities and the basic commitments of their 
culture. Philosophy has an irreplaceable role here, 
too. To diminish the role of this discipline in our 
schools is to diminish the preparation we offer to 
our students whom we challenge to go and set the 
world on fire. This challenge echoes the challenge 
that the life of Socrates raises, namely, to do 
where they live what he did in Athens: revere truth 
and justice, question the prevailing “wisdom” of 
the age, irritate, cajole, point to nonsense and call 
it nonsense, demand and help find better answers. 
The alternative to this understanding of 
Philosophy as a friend of cura personalis, metanoia, 
etc. is what may be called “Philosophy without 
commitment.” This alternative understands 
philosophy to be little more than a buffet of ideas 
and arguments which equip one to support or to 
critique just about any position, depending upon 
one’s desires. Philosophy on this model does not 
revere truth and justice, does not illuminate cura 
personalis, is not animated by the magis, and does 
not seek metanoia. Instead, one engaged in this way 
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of philosophizing is akin to G. K. Chesterton’s 
new rebel. Chesterton writes,  
[T]he new rebel is a skeptic, and will not 
entirely trust anything. He has no loyalty; 
he can never be really a revolutionist. And 
the fact that he doubts everything really 
gets in his way when he wants to 
denounce anything. For all denunciation 
implies a moral doctrine of some kind; 
and the modern revolutionist doubts not 
only the institution he denounces, but the 
doctrine by which he denounces it…. In 
short, the modern revolutionist, being an 
infinite skeptic, is always engaged in 
undermining his own mines. In his book 
on politics he attacks men for trampling 
on morality; in his book on ethics he 
attacks morality for trampling on men. 
Therefore the modern man in revolt has 
become practically useless for all purposes 
of revolt. By rebelling against everything 
he has lost his right to rebel against 
anything.34  
Standing in contrast to the role that Philosophy 
might play in the new rebel’s life stands the role 
that Philosophy plays in the Catholic and Jesuit 
tradition. Philosophy in this tradition, one shaped 
in part by the ideals and aspirations of cura 
personalis, magis, finding God in all things, and metanoia, 
is Philosophy with a perspective, with deep 
commitments, with a certain orientation. It is 
Philosophy that will frequently bump up against, 
and can stand up against, the aforementioned 
errors of our age. It is not Philosophy as a buffet 
of ideas, arguments, and positions that can be 
used as needed to manipulate others, to advance 
one’s program, to make oneself useful to those 
who would pursue lesser things. Instead, it is 
philosophy as Socrates practiced it, it is 
philosophy in the Ignatian tradition that our 
colleges and universities claim as their own. 
Within this tradition, both the role and the value 
of the study of philosophy far exceed that of 
cultivating a set of transferrable intellectual skills 
(critical thinking, etc.). This ancient discipline also 
offers our students what no other discipline can: a 
sustained, direct, and nuanced rational articulation 
and defense of the Catholic and Jesuit tradition’s 
identity-conferring beliefs and ideals. As our 
graduates leave us we know that they head off to a 
culture that will often be at odds with all that we 
stand for. If we have not prepared them to 
withstand these challenges and to be leaven in the 
world by exposing the philosophical errors of the 
age and offering a better alternative, then we have 
not done for them all that we could, and should, 
have done. Indeed, one clear measure of the 
authenticity and depth of an institution’s 
commitment to its Ignatian beliefs and animating 
aspirations, and to the well-being of its students, is 
that institution’s commitment to Philosophy in its 
core curriculum. Maintaining (and restoring, even 
expanding, where needed) a central role for 
Philosophy in the core curricula of Jesuit colleges 
and universities is a necessary element in 
authentically living out the mission and identity of 
Catholic and Jesuit institutions of higher learning.  
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